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The Presence of a Web Site as a
Constitutionally Permissible Basis for
Personal Jurisdictiont
CHRISTINE E. MAYEWSKI"
Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about by
technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may
have been reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to
reality, and injustice rather than justice is promoted.'
INTRODUCTION
The World Wide Web 2 presents an incredible opportunity for businesses of
every size to peddle products and services to an interstate, and even international,
audience at relatively little expense.3 For many medium- and large-sized
businesses, maintaining a Web site' is now considered a necessity.5 Should
businesses that embrace this technological advancement be required to travel to
f © 1997 by Christine E. Mayewski.
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1. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (IlI. 1961).
Thirty-six years ago, the Gray court, considering "the facts of economic life as it is lived
today," applied the stream-of-commerce doctrine to uphold personal jurisdiction over a parts
manufacturer from another state. Id.
2. The World Wide Web ("Web" or "WWW") can be described as a collection of a vast
number of electronic documents, stored in millions of computers all over the world. The
technology behind the World Wide Web allows any individual to view the content of any
document on the Web without worrying about the format of the document, the software
program that created it, or the type of computer used to create it. The World Wide Web is one
service available on the Internet. See infra Part I.B. For more detailed information about the
Internet, including the World Wide Web, see Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334-37 (1997).
See also BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, WORLD WIDE WEB BIBLE 33-51 (2d ed. 1996); About the
World Wide Web (visited Sept. 15, 1997) <http://www.w3.org/WWW>.
3. At last count, the potential global audience was estimated at 23 million. See Dennis F.
Hemandez & David May, Is Mere Internet Presence Sufficient State Contact?, L.A. DAILY J.,
July 15, 1996, at 5, 5. See infra note 94 for information on the cost of setting up a Web site.
4. A "Web site" is a document or set of linked documents ("pages") with special features
that allow it to display information graphically to a user of the WWW. The first, or main,
"page" of a Web site is the "home page." All forms of commercial activity can be accomplished
on the WWW. For a general summary of legal issues relating to the use of a Web site, see
ONLINE LAW: THE SPA's LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET 366-69 (Thomas
J. Smedinghoffed., 1996).
5. See Laura B. Smith, Frontier Economics: Internet Presence Almost Necessity, PC WK.,
Dec. 11, 1995, at El. According to Smith, experts have predicted that the Internet will account
for 1.3% of the nation's economy, or $45.8 billion, by the year 2000. See id.
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a distant forum to defend suit anywhere their Web site may be accessed?6 Two
divergent views have emerged from the United States district courts. On the one
hand, a finding of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident based solely on the
existence of a Web site is undesirable because it would presumably lead to
nationwide, or indeed worldwide, jurisdiction over all Web site owners.7 On the
other hand, businesses that operate Web sites have voluntarily declared
themselves open for business to the entire world.' Moreover, the ability of World
Wide Web communications to contain advanced forms of content, coupled with
the speed at which such communications reach a vast audience, dramatically
increases the amount of harm that may be inflicted on innocent parties, even if
unintentional.9 Broadening the scope of personal jurisdiction may thus be a
permissible response to this unprecedented technological advancement.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court's last ruling on a personal jurisdiction issue,
technological developments have continued to bring people around the world
closer together.'0 World Wide Web communications in particular do not easily
fit into the existing personal jurisdiction analytical framework because such
communications occur independent of geography. Resolution of the personal
jurisdiction issue could have profound implications for the future of a global
commerce that increasingly relies on the existence of the World Wide Web. Only
one federal appeals court has thus far decided a jurisdiction case in this context,"
but the number of such cases entering district courts in the past year indicates
that many more are likely to follow. For these reasons, guidance is needed from
the Supreme Court regarding the appropriate prioritization of the different
considerations involved in the personal jurisdiction analysis.
This Note discusses the current philosophical split in the district courts and
argues for a broader interpretation of personal jurisdiction in the context of
6. This question has attracted the attention of several commentators. See, e.g., John
Gibeaut, Questions ofAuthority: Jurisdiction Cases Crop Up as Internet Sales Erase Borders,
A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 42; Karol A. Kepchar, How Far is the Courts' Reach in Solving
Cyberspace Disputes?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia), Mar. 26, 1997, at 7, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Lglint File; Mark R. Kravitz, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet,
CONN. L. TRIB., Apr. 21, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legnews Library, Clt File. See also Hearst
Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at *66 n.21 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 1997), for a more comprehensive list of articles that have been published on the
subject.
7. See Hearst, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065; IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958
F. Supp. 1258, 1268 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
8. See, e.g., Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Conn.
1996); accord California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D.
Cal. 1986).
9. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
10. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), was the last U.S.
Supreme Court decision on the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction under the Due
Process Clause.
11. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
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electronic communications, particularly those involving the World Wide Web. 2
Part I explains the analytical framework for resolving personal jurisdiction
questions and describes the analogy-defying characteristics of the World Wide
Web. Part II synthesizes the cases that have addressed personal jurisdiction in the
World Wide Web context, honing in on the cases that involve Web site
advertising. Part III argues in favor of a broader reading of personal jurisdiction
in disputes that arise out of the existence of a Web site. Finally, Part IV
concludes that expanding the scope of personal jurisdiction in this context is
appropriate and consistent with the concerns of the Due Process Clause.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Analyzing a Personal Jurisdiction Problem
When a plaintiff wishes to sue an out-of-state defendant in the state of its
choosing, personal jurisdiction is likely one of the first obstacles the plaintiff
must overcome. Before a nonresident defendant can be called on to defend suit
in a distant forum or accede to a default judgment, 3 the court selected by the
plaintiff must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 4
Two requirements must be satisfied in order for a court 5 to establish
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The court must first determine whether
the forum state's long-arm statute allows jurisdiction, and second, whether the
12. For support of the view that existing legal paradigms can adequately address the
problems of the Internet, see Richard S. Zembek, Comment, Jurisdiction and the Internet:
Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339
(1996).
13. It is possible that the forum chosen by the plaintiff may be so disadvantageous to the
defendant that the defendant's right to due process would be violated. The nonresident
defendant may elect not to appear, and hope that when the plaintiff attempts to enforce the
judgment against him in his home state, the defendant's state court will refuse to enforce the
judgment for want ofjurisdiction. Respect for other states' judgments is required by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, unless the court rendering the
judgment lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See 1 ROBERT C. CASAD,
JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 2.01, at 2-4 (2d ed. 1991); GENER SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-
HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12, at 42 (2d ed. 1994).
14. See SHREVE & RAVEN-HANsEN, supra note 13, § 8[B][1], at 25. Defendants may
challenge the court's assertion of personal jurisdiction by filing a pretrial motion such as a
motion to dismiss. Since the personal jurisdiction is a preliminary litigation matter, the extent
of factual inquiry at this stage is generally limited. See id. § 11, at 37-41.
15. The Fourteenth Amendment applies the Due Process Clause to state courts. Federal
courts are limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but arguably not to the
same degree. See id. § 8[B][2], at 25-26. However, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires federal courts to look to the jurisdictional rules of the local state court
(which include the constitutional limitations) in most cases. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)
("Service of a summons... is effective to establish jurisdiction over the person of a defendant
... who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in
which the district court is located."); see also SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 13, §
8[B][2], at 26.
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assertion of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant complies with
the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 6 Many
states' long-arm statutes simply allow personal jurisdiction to the extent
permitted by the Due Process Clause.17 In these states, the above inquiry
collapses into one step. Assuming the long-arm statute is satisfied, all states must
address the constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction. This Note will
therefore assume, when necessary, that the applicable state long-arm statute has
been satisfied.
In order for personal jurisdiction to be established over a nonresident
defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the defendant have sufficient
"minimum contacts" with the forum state such that personal jurisdiction complies
with "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.."".. The Supreme
Court has developed two additional analytical tools, the concepts of "general"
and "specific" jurisdiction, to assess the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts
with the forum. 9 General jurisdiction permits a plaintiff to sue a defendant in the
forum state even for claims unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum.
16. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A cause of action can be considered a
"property" interest that may not be deprived through state proceedings lacking due process. See
1 CASAD, supra note 13, § 2.02[l], at 2-7 to 2-10; SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 13,
§ 8[B][l], at 24 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-29 (1982)).
Although the Supreme Court has clearly identified the constitutional origin of the personal
jurisdiction requirement, it has been less successful in articulating its underlying policies and
justifications. Territorial sovereignty, defendant's inconvenience, protecting the defendant from
jurisdictional surprise, preservation of states' regulatory interests, and defendant's receipt of
economic benefits from association with the forum have all been given varying levels of
emphasis from one decision to next. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 34, at 95-96 (2d ed. 1993).
17. California, Louisiana, and Missouri are examples of states that allow personal
jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Constitution. New York is an example of a state that
imposes additional requirements. See RIC MAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 33, at 84-86.
See also David Thatch, Personal Jurisdiction and the World-Wide Web: Bits (and Bytes) of
Minimum Contacts, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 143, 147 n. 14 (1997), for thorough
coverage of state long-arm statutes.
18. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The dominant theory of personal jurisdiction for 70 years
dictated that states could entertain suits against their own citizens, and over nonresidents only
if they could be "found and served" within that forum. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877). As technological developments such as the automobile increased the mobility of
American society, courts invented alternate means to support jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants. In 1945, the U.S. Supreme Court decided International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
the decision that abolished the in-state presence requirement and replaced it with a less
formalistic, "fact-centered" approach commonly referred to as the "minimum contacts" test. See
SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 13, § 12, at 41-49.
19. See SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 13, § 16[B], at 72 n.9, § 18, at 79. Some
commentators have also advocated a "sliding-scale" approach to address cases that fall between
the two paradigms. For example, as the significance of a defendant's forum contacts increases,
a weaker connection between the cause of action and the forum is permissible, and vice versa.
The Supreme Court, however, has not thus far addressed the constitutionality of such an
approach. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 36[B], at 99.
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In contrast, specific jurisdiction exists when the nonresident's contacts with the
forum state give rise to the controversy at hand.2" In such a case, jurisdiction is
limited to the cause of action resulting from the defendant's contacts with the
forum.2
General jurisdiction requires numerous and substantial contacts with the forum
state.2 Therefore, it is unlikely that the existence of a defendant's Web site,
alone, would be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction for claims unrelated
to the Web site.23 However, since the existence of a Web site has given rise to
litigation involving, for example, free speech,24 defamation,25 trademark,26
copyright,27 and contract28 claims, specific jurisdiction has been an active
battleground for cases involving the existence of Web sites and will be the focus
of this Note.
Evaluating the constitutionality of specific jurisdiction is generally a two-step
process.2 9 Courts must determine (1) whether the nonresident defendant has
purposefully availed herself or himself of the privilege of doing business in the
20. See SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 13, § 17, at 73.
21. See id
22. For example, if a defendant conducts nearly all of its activities in the forum even though
it is not incorporated there, general jurisdiction should be proper. Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), is a good example. In Perkins, the defendant
was a Philippine corporation conducting extensive business in Ohio due to the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines. Ohio was the residence of key corporate officers, and its banks
handled corporate funds. Although the plaintiffs claim related to the defendant's Philippine
operations, the Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction in Ohio. See SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN,
supra note 13, § 18, at 79.
23. See McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. CIV. 95-4037, 1996 WL 753991, at
*3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996) (stating that creating a Web site does not provide the necessary
minimum contacts with a forum state to give rise to jurisdiction there because such a result
would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement as it currently exists); see also IDS Life
Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Naxos Resources (U.S.A.)
Ltd. v. Southam Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2265 (C.D. Cal. 1996). But see Haelan Prods.
Inc. v. Beso Biological, No. 97-0571, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10565 (E.D. La. July 11, 1997)
(noting that while a Web site, without more, would be insufficient to establish general
jurisdiction, the combined existence of the defendant's Web site, toll-free number, and
advertisements in a national magazine was sufficient to confer general jurisdiction).
24. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.
Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
25. See Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
26. See Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
27. See McDonough, 1996 WL 753991.
28. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
29. This assumes the court has already determined that the claim arises from the
defendant's contacts with the forum state, as required for specific jurisdiction. See SHREVE &
RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 13, § 17, at 73.
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forum state,3" and (2) whether jurisdiction over the defendant would be
reasonable.3
1. The "Purposeful Availment" Requirement
To satisfy the "purposeful availment" requirement, a defendant must have such
minimum contacts or "purposeful direction of activities"32 toward the forum state
that it would "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" there.33 While it is
clear that physical presence of the defendant34 in the forum state is no longer a
requirement,35 the extent to which nonphysical contacts can confer jurisdiction
30. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("[I]t is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities with the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.").
31. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980). The Asahi Court indicated that reasonableness was an inquiry separate from the
sufficiency of defendant's contacts with the forum. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 16,
§ 37[a], at 105.
32. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
774 (1984)).
33. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
34. It should be noted that although consideration is sometimes given to the plaintiff's and
the claim's contacts with the forum, it is generally the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts
that is the focus of the purposeful-availment, or minimum-contacts, analysis. See, e.g., Keeton,
465 U.S. 770 (noting the plaintiff had no contact with the forum other than that the magazine
in which she was defamed was distributed there); see also RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note
16, § 36[d], at 100-01.
35. The International Shoe Co. v. Washington decision replaced the rigid physical presence
test with a broader fairness approach, but did not make clear whether the contacts between the
defendant and the forum state needed to be physical in nature in order to satisfy due process.
Recognizing a trend toward expanding the scope of personal jurisdiction, due in part to the
proliferation of business being conducted via interstate mail, the Court in McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), upheld personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant based on one significant, nonphysical contact with the forum state-a
life insurance contract. That decision may be considered the high water mark of the permissible
scope of personal jurisdiction, but it has been cited favorably in several decisions involving
Internet contacts.
A year after McGee, the Court decided Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, in which the
"purposeful availment" language originated. Thus, it was becoming apparent that due process
did not require the relationship between the defendant and the forum state to have actual
physical components, as long as the contacts were purposeful in nature. Subsequent decisions
stressed the importance of the defendant's own purposeful, forum-based activity. The realities
of the increasingly national economy meant that defendants could cause injury in a distant
forum based on more attenuated contacts. Establishing purposeful availment became
problematic in interstate commerce- situations. The Court responded by suggesting minimum-
contacts might be satisfied if a defendant either received economic benefit from the forum, or
caused injury to the forum by expressly aimed tortious actions. See generally SHREVE &
RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 13, §§ 12-15. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Court
recognized that "it is an inescapable fact of modem commercial life that a substantial amount
of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communication across state lines, thus
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over a defendant who is not present in the forum state seems heavily fact
dependent. Factors the Supreme Court has considered relevant in determining
whether a defendant's contacts with the forum are sufficient to indicate
purposeful availment include: whether the defendant could foresee that it would
be required to defend suit in the forum state;36 whether the defendant initiated the
contact with the forum state or sought business there;"' and whether the
defendant established the contact with the forum purposefully.3"
Purposefulness is most difficult to establish when the cause of action results,
in whole or in part, from the mere presence of the nonresident defendant's
product or service in the forum state. State courts developed the "stream-of-
commerce" theory" to address these situations where an out-of-state business's
only contact with the forum was through a defective product that caused injury.4"
This doctrine holds that a retailer of defective goods should be amenable to suit
wherever its products are distributed through the stream of commerce, directly
or indirectly." Otherwise, an out-of-state retailer could avoid suit in the forum
by employing middlemen to distribute its product in the forum, and still receive
the economic benefit of the sale of its goods.42
The Supreme Court first addressed the stream-of-commerce rationale in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.43 That case involved a product that entered
the forum not through normal distribution channels, but through the foreseeable
action of the consumer.44 Still, the Court held that jurisdiction was not proper
over the nonresident defendant because it was merely "fortuitous" that the
defendant's product would have entered the forum-the defendant's "conduct
and connection with the forum State" were not such that it should have
obviating the need for physical presence." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. The Supreme Court
has upheld personal jurisdiction where the defendant has sent into the forum a contract offer
(McGee), a business partner (Burger King), or a defamatory news article (Keeton).
36. Foreseeability is a relevant, but not sufficient, basis for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
37. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 36[f], at 103 (comparing the results in
McGee and Hanson).
38. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286; see also RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra
note 16, § 36[g], at 104.
39. Two of the leading cases were Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 57 (Cal.
1969), and Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
See R. Lawrence Dessem, Personal Jurisdiction After Asahi: The Other (International) Shoe
Drops, 55 TENN. L. REv. 41, 51-52 (1987), for discussion of the stream-of-commerce theory
in the lower courts.
40. See I CASAD, supra note 13, § 7.02[2][c][ii], at 7-26 to 7-36; RICHMAN & REYNOLDS,
supra note 16, § 36[g], at 104.
41. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 36[g], at 104.
42. See id.
43. 444 U.S. 286.
44. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs bought a car from the defendant, a regional
retailer located in New York whose territory included New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.
While driving the car from New York to Arizona, the plaintiffs were involved in an automobile
accident in Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued in Oklahoma state court, contending the accident
was, at least in part, due to a defect in the car. See id. at 288.
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reasonably anticipated being haled into court there.45 In refusing jurisdiction, the
Court apparently sought to provide guidance to nonresident defendants for
determining what level of conduct would render them liable to suit in a distant
forum.46 In addition, the Court sought to avoid a situation where a "seller of
chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process."47
The Supreme Court most recently discussed the stream-of-commerce theory in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,48 but did not resolve the issue. That
case presented a complex set of facts involving a defendant who was neither a
resident of the forum state, nor of the United States. The defendant was a
Japanese parts manufacturer who sold its component parts (motorcycle-tire tube
valves) to a motorcycle-tire tube manufacturer based in Taiwan, which in turn
sold the tubes in California. 49 The plaintiff was injured in California while riding
a motorcycle containing the allegedly defective tube and valve assembly."0
However, by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs had
settled their claim with the tube manufacturer, leaving only the tube
manufacturer's indemnification claim against Asahi.5 ' Justice O'Connor,
representing a four-member plurality, 2 argued that the defendant's mere act of
placing its product into the stream of commerce was not sufficient to indicate
purposeful availment, even though the defendant knew that its product would
ultimately enter California. Assertion of personal jurisdiction by California over
Asahi was therefore improper.5 3 Justice O'Connor viewed purposeful availment
as requiring not only awareness, but additional contacts purposefully directed at
the forum indicating an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum state.
According to the O'Connor view, such additional contacts could include:
evidence that the product was specifically designed for the market in the forum
state, advertising in the forum state, existence of customer service in the forum
state, or marketing through a sales agent whose territory included the forum
state.54
Five justices rejected O'Connor's strict interpretation of the purposeful
availment requirement. Justice Brennan, representing another group of four
45. Id. at 297.
46. See id
47. Id. at 296. Justices Brennan and Marshall, in dissents, recognized that the rapid
expansion of interstate travel and commerce made it more reasonable and less burdensome to
expect the defendant to defend suit in a distant forum. See id. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
49. See id. at 106-07.
50. See id. at 105-06.
51. See id. at 106.
52. The Chief Justice, Justice Powell, and Justice Scalia joined the minimum-contacts
portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion. See id. at 105.
53. See id. at 112-13.
54. See id. at 112.
55. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun. See id. at 116
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens suggested that
minimum contacts did exist, but concluded that a decision regarding minimum contacts was
unnecessary because, as he reviewed the record, the facts failed the reasonableness step. See
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Justices, argued that a showing of "additional conduct" was unnecessary.56
Justice Brennan viewed the stream of commerce itself not as "unpredictable
currents or eddies," but as a more predictable flow from which a manufacturer
could reasonably anticipate the destination of its product.5 " Justice Brennan
reasoned that the possibility of a lawsuit could not come as a surprise to one who
participates in the stream of commerce as long as the participant is aware that its
product is being marketed in the forum state.58 Further, Justice Brennan reasoned
that the manufacturer receives economic benefit from the forum state regardless
of whether it engages in "additional conduct" or merely relies on the stream of
commerce. Therefore, litigation in the forum state would not present a burden
"for which there is no corresponding benefit." 9
In response to the Supreme Court's lack of clarity, the circuit courts have
varied in their approaches to the stream-of-commerce theory. Some circuits have
endorsed the Brennan view that awareness that a product has entered the stream
of interstate commerce satisfies minimum-contacts. 6' At least one circuit has
adopted the O'Connor view and required additional contacts. 6' The remaining
circuits have devised their own tests or avoided the issue. 62 However, in recent
years, the lower courts have applied the stream-of-commerce analogy to non-
products liability cases involving interstate or international commerce.63
2. The "Reasonableness" Factors
In addition to the requirement that the defendant's contacts with the forum
indicate purposeful availment, due process requires that it be reasonable for the
defendant to defend suit in the forum state.' In general, this "reasonableness"
test requires a court to weigh the burden to the defendant of having to litigate in
id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
56. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
57. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
58. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
59. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
60. The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have followed the original stream-of- commerce
theory advocated by Justice Brennan in Asahi. See Martin F. Noonan, Evolution and Current
Interpretation of the Stream of Commerce Test in the Third Circuit, 40 VILL. L. REv. 779, 793-
96 (1995).
61. The First Circuit has adopted the O'Connor view. See Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967
F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992).
62. The Federal, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have devised their own tests or
avoided the issue. See Noonan, supra note 60, at 793-94, 801.
63. See Lori Elizabeth Jones, Note, Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co.-The Pure
Stream of Commerce No Longer Flows Through the Fourth Circuit, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 421,
421-22, 449 (1995) (citing breach-of-contract, trademark infringement, and fraud cases).
64. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,294 (1980); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); RICHMAN& REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 34, at 95.
The "reasonableness" test refers to the second part of the International Shoe test: "the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."' International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
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the forum versus the interests of the forum state, the plaintiff, and the "interstate
judicial system" in litigating there.65 The Supreme Court has traditionally
regarded the purposeful-availment analysis as the more important step,66 having
given comparatively little attention to the reasonableness factors.67 However, it
is significant that eight of the nine Asahijustices agreed that jurisdiction could
not be upheld over Asahi under the reasonableness analysis, despite their
disagreement on the contacts issue.68 It is therefore possible that as electronic
communications continue to increase and become more complex, purposeful
availment will become even more difficult to assess, and the reasonableness
analysis will take a more prominent role.69
Between World- Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, the Supreme Court decided three
cases that seemed to place more emphasis on reasonableness factors.7" These
cases may provide guidance to courts assessing whether Internet contacts are
enough to satisfy due process. Keeton and Calder, both libel actions, indicate
that the interests of the plaintiff and the forum state may influence the minimum-
contacts analysis. Burger King was a contract action in which the Court seemed
to indicate that strong reasonableness factors could compensate for relatively
weak contacts with the forum state to favor jurisdiction over the nonresident.
In Keeton, New York resident Kathy Keeton sued Hustler, an Ohio
corporation, in New Hampshire because it was the only state left where the libel
claim was not barred by its statute of limitations.7' The Supreme Court concluded
65. The five factors of this balancing test are: (1) the burden on the defendant of defending
in a distant forum; (2) the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining "convenient and effective relief'; (4) the interest of the interstatejudicial system in efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the "interest of the several states
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77.
66. See, e.g., id. (arguing that once minimum contacts have been established, those contacts
may be considered in light of the reasonableness factors).
67. See Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying "Fair Play and Substantial Justice": How the
Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for Personal Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 441, 441-42 (1991). Lower courts have differed on how much weight to give the different
reasonableness factors. Some courts require a stronger showing of reasonableness when facts
indicating purposeful availment meet the bare minimum, and vice versa. See RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 37[c], at 109-10. See also Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda
Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework for Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues
in This New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1083, 1131 nn.319-23 (1996), and RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 37, at 105-09, for further explanation of the reasonableness
factors.
68. Only Justice Scalia refused join the reasonableness portion of Justice O'Connor's
opinion. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114-16.
69. This may be especially true since courts likely desire to limit the extent of the factual
inquiry on ajurisdictional challenge.
70. Two of these decisions, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), and
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), were decided prior to the formulation of the Court's
five-factor reasonableness test, which first appeared in Burger King. Still, World-Wide
Volkswagen had earlier indicated that fairness or reasonableness was a required component of
the jurisdiction analysis. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980).
71. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772-73.
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that Hustler's regular circulation of magazines in the forum justified the exercise
of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine, because
regular sales of the magazine were not "random, isolated, or fortuitous."'72 In
assessing the reasonableness factors, the Court found that New Hampshire,
though not the residence of either party, had an interest in redressing injuries
suffered by defamation victims and protecting New Hampshire consumers.73
Further, the Court addressed the plaintiff's lack of connection with the forum by
stating that the plaintiff's contacts with the forum "are important only insofar as
they 'enhance defendant's contact with the forum."'74 Thus, although the Keeton
decision may have been limited to the facts involved, it certainly suggests that
factors other than a defendant's contacts with the forum may support jurisdiction.
Calder, on the other hand, was an example of a situation where plaintiff's
contacts with the forum significantly enhanced the importance of defendant's
contacts. California resident Shirley Jones sued National Enquirer magazine in
California on the basis of an article published by the magazine about Jones.75
Jones joined as individual defendants the article's author and editor, who were
both citizens of Florida. 6 The Supreme Court concluded that jurisdiction was
proper over the individual defendants because their activities had caused
"effects" in California-the article had relied on California sources and injured
the reputation of a California resident whose career was centered in California.77
Thus, Calder seems to indicate that jurisdiction over nonresidents is favored if
the forum state is the locus of injury to the plaintiff.
Finally, the Court's Burger King decision gave some attention to the
reasonableness factors. Michigan defendant John Rudzewicz entered into a
franchise agreement with Burger King, headquartered in Florida, to operate a
Burger King restaurant in Michigan." When the business at Rudzewicz's Burger
King declined and Rudzewicz fell behind on franchise payments, Burger King
sought to terminate the agreement and sued in its home state. 9 While
Rudzewicz's contacts with Burger King's district office were more frequent, he
had visited the Florida headquarters, negotiated with the Florida headquarters,
and agreed to a choice-of-law clause which called for the application of Florida
law in the event of suit.80
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan had no trouble concluding that
Burger King could sue Rudzewicz in Florida without violating his due process
rights, because Rudzewicz had purposefully directed activities toward that
72. Id at 774.
73. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 23, at 44. Note that libel actions are
governed by the "single publication rule" whereby a libel victim may recover in one forum
damages for the harm caused everywhere due to the defamation. See id.
74. Id § 23, at 45 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 770). The Court suggested the case of
Calder as an example. See id § 23, at 45 n.1.
75. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 784.
76. See id. at 785-86.
77. See id. at 788-89.
78. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 466-67 (1985).
79. See id at 468.
80. See id. at 480-81.
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state." Attending to the reasonableness factors, Brennan indicated that once
Burger King had demonstrated that Rudzewicz had purposefully established a
business relationship with Florida, Rudzewicz bore the burden of presenting
other factors that would "outweigh the considerations discussed above and...
establish the unconstitutionality of Florida's assertion of jurisdiction." 2
Furthermore, Justice Brennan rejected the court of appeals's conclusion that the
restaurant had eminently superior bargaining power, noting that Rudzewicz was
an experienced accountant, had advice of counsel throughout negotiations, and
had been able to secure modest concessions from Burger King in the deal. 3
Therefore, the defendant had not shown that litigating in Florida would impair
his ability to defend the lawsuit. 4
In sum, the post-World-Wide Volkswagen cases seem to indicate that the
Supreme Court has been less concerned with counting the defendant's forum
contacts and more concerned with balancing the location and severity of the harm
caused by the defendant's activity against the inconvenience to the defendant of
litigating outside its home state. To be sure, the personal jurisdiction analysis is
flexible and highly fact specific. However, as the International Shoe Court
recognized many years ago, 5 such flexibility is necessary for a doctrine that must
keep pace with technological developments which continue to break down
territorial barriers to commerce and communication.
B. What's Different About Web Sites?
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the Internet is a "'unique and
wholly new medium of worldwide human communication."' 6 The World Wide
81. See id. at 479-80 (noting that instead of electing to open up a local restaurant, the
defendant had deliberately reached beyond the borders of his home state to do business with
a multistate corporation).
82. Id at 482 (emphasis in original). The Court stated that reasonableness considerations
could "sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness ofjurisdiction upon a lesser showing
of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required." Id. at 477. For reactions to this
decision, see generally Rex R. Perschbacher, Minimum Contacts Reapplied: Mr. Justice
Brennan Has It His Way in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 1986 ARIz. ST. L.J. 585, and
Pamela J. Stephens, The Single Contract as Minimum Contacts: Justice Brennan "Has It His
Way", 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 89 (1986). Note that this was not the first time that the
Supreme Court decided that a contract provided the basis for personal jurisdiction. See McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
83. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 485.
84. See id. at 483.
85. The International Shoe Court acknowledged that "[i]t is evident that the criteria by
which we mark the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a
corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
86. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997) (quoting and affirming ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). The Court stated that justifications for federal
regulation of broadcast media, such as the scarcity of available frequencies at inception and its
"'invasive' nature" do not apply to the Internet. Id. at 2343.
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Web8 7 is among the best-known88 and most heavily commercialized89 of the
communication tools available on the Internet. Lower courts have, with much
difficulty and little success, attempted to compare Internet communications to
more traditional modes of communication.' There are at least five characteristics
of the Web that combine to make it a unique form of communication unlike more
traditionally accepted communication tools: ease of use, low cost, speed, content
capabilities, and absence of geographical constraints.
The Web is easy to use because of its graphical presentation,9 ' but also because
it enables a user to access all of the features of the Internet using one software
87. See supra note 2.
88. See supra note 3.
89. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 842, aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329. Established businesses
and entrepreneurs alike are taking advantage of the Web. Such entities operate Web sites in
order to advertise products and services as well as to directly solicit business. See id. For
example, Pepsi, Time Warner, Eddie Bauer, and Columbia House are just a few of the major
commercial entities using the Web. See Gwenn M. Kalow, From the Internet to Court:
Exercising Jurisdiction over World Wide Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241,
2247 nn.35-40 (1997). According to Kalow, the Eddie Bauer and Columbia House Web sites
allow users to purchase products via the Internet. See id.
90. In Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-33 (E.D. Mo. 1996), the
court, granting jurisdiction, rejected comparisons of Internet communications to mail and 800
telephone numbers. Unlike traditional mail, electronic mail is tremendously more efficient and
reaches a vast audience much more quickly. See id. Internet communications are also quicker
and more efficient than an 800-number, the court said, because an 800-number must still be
advertised in print media, and because of the expanded capabilities (including downloading and
printing of documents) of the Internet. See id. Finally, the court pointed out that a user may
access a Web site without knowing its exact address. See id. at 1333.
The court in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Conn.
1996), granting jurisdiction, distinguished Web sites from TV and radio advertisements, which
broadcast advertisements only at specific times, and from newspapers, which are disposed of
quickly. In contrast, Web sites are continuously available to all Web users, and may be
accessed repeatedly. See id.
In Haelan Products Inc. v. Beso Biological, No. 97-0571, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10565,
at *1 -*2 (E.D. La. July 11, 1997), the court, granting jurisdiction, described Internet domain
names (the unique addresses of Web sites) as like telephone numbers, only having more
significance because the domain name often contains a trademarked corporate name, and there
is no satisfactory equivalent of a telephone directory on the Internet.
In American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the court
determined that the case implicated the Commerce Clause because the Internet, as a new
instrument of interstate commerce, was analogous to a "highway or railroad."
The court in Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2065,
at *30-*40 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997), refusing jurisdiction, compared a Web site which did not
yet promote the sale of products to an advertisement in a national magazine. The court said the
magazine advertisement was appropriate because such advertisements may be viewed by people
in all 50 states (and the world, for that matter) but do not target the residents of any particular
state. See id. at *30-*35.
91. Use of the World Wide Web does not require knowledge of computer programming,
for example.
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program.92 In addition, many searching tools are available on the Web to assist
users in finding the information they desire.93 Thus, Web users need not be
particularly computer literate, nor must they be experts on research techniques,
in order to use the resources available on the Web effectively.
Setting up a computer to connect to the Web is also relatively cheap and easy
to do.94 Most new computers today are sold ready to access the Web. Therefore,
Web users represent a diverse cross section of the world population. While its
low cost and ease-of-use enable small, entrepreneurial businesses to take
advantage of the Web marketplace, it also allows promoters of fraudulent
schemes and deceptive advertisers to do the same.9"
Two key distinguishing features of Web communications are its ability to
handle multiple forms of content and its lack of geographic restrictions. Web
users view text and graphic information together in a type of interactive
document called a "site" or "page."96 Text displayed on a page may be read
sequentially like a book or pamphlet, or the user can "jump" to a new site by
"pointing and clicking" on a highlighted portion of the text. This "linking"
capability has no bounds: users can jump from a page located in Indiana to one
in Singapore without the restraints of time and geographic distance.
Moreover, the content of a Web communication may be richly enhanced to
contain not only text, but video clips, audio recordings, or photo images.
Therefore, Web sites are potentially more interesting and entertaining to a user
than a mere newspaper or magazine. Web sites may even be more attractive than
television or radio because of the degree of control the user has in selecting
which sites and which information to access. Furthermore, Web site content is
often more current than the day's newspaper because it can be changed or
updated at any time by the entity operating the Web site, and the changes are
effected immediately.97
92. See LAURA LEMAY, TEACH YOURSELF WEB PUBLISHING WITH HTML 3.0 IN A WEEK 9
(2d ed. 1996). Using a Web browser, one has access to the WWW in addition to electronic mail
and the other older information systems on the Internet, such as Usenet news groups, Gopher
databases, FTP, Telnet, and WAIS databases. See id.
93. See id. at 13, 17. Web users may seek out information in one of three ways: by typing
in the exact address of a Web site (called its "domain name," see infra note 145), by linking
from one Web site to the next, or by using a search engine (such as AltaVista, Infoseek, or
WebCrawler) to look for Web sites that match certain keywords. Recently, some Web sites
have implemented "push" technology, making it even easier for users to search the Web. See
Noel D. Humphreys, New Push Software Likely Will Subject Companies to Jurisdiction,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May 1997, at 4, available in LEXIS, Curnws Library, Legnew
File. This technology enables Web users to save specific searches with a push technology
vendor (such as PointCast). See id, The vendor then executes the search periodically and sends
the results directly to the Web user. See id.
94. For instance, a local Indiana Internet access provider, On Ramp Indiana, currently
charges $50 per month to house a Web site and provide unlimited Internet access.
95. See Christopher Wolf & Scott Schorr, Cybercops are Cracking Down on Internet
Fraud: Federal and State Officials Have Stepped Up Efforts in the Battle Against Info-
Highway Robbery, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 13, 1997, at B12.
96. See LEMAY, supra note 92, at 19-20. Before the Web, users navigated the Internet's
services via text commands and "arcane tools." Id. at 6.
97. See id. at 7.
[Vol. 73:297
1997] WEB SITE AS BASIS FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION 311
As alluded to above, the inherently interactive nature of the World Wide Web
provides capabilities superior to many other forms of communication. The World
Wide Web has therefore attracted the attention of a broad cross section of
individuals around the world. As a result of the Web's popularity, many
businesses now seek to exploit its commercial potential. However, the lack of
geographic restrictions may also breed a feeling that one is not subject to the
legal restrictions of the "physical" world. As the use of the World Wide Web
continues to grow and expand, the amount of litigation involving Web sites will
continue to increase.
II. HOW THE DISTRICT COURTS HAVE TREATED THE
EXISTENCE OF A WEB SITE
As mentioned earlier, litigation involving Internet communications has arisen
in a variety of contexts.9" Prior to 1996, plaintiffs in Internet-related suits
generally sued defendants where they lived. 99 As the Internet has become more
popular, however, defendants are increasingly being required to travel to the
plaintiff s forum state to defend suit.'
Where courts have been able to determine that the nonresident defendant has
either transacted business (albeit electronically) in the forum or purposefully
targeted the plaintiff with injurious activity, they have been able to apply existing
personal jurisdiction principles fairly comfortably to find jurisdiction proper.
The greatest difficulty has occurred when the facts of a case have not easily fit
either of the above paradigms: the defendant did not clearly transact business in
the forum, and it was not clear that the defendant had purposefully sought to
harm the plaintiff. This section will set the stage by summarizing Internet cases
that seem to fit easily into the traditional "transacting business" and "tortious
conduct" paradigms.' Then, the more difficult cases that do not easily fit either
category will be explored in detail.
A. Conducting Electronic Commerce Constitutes
Purposeful Availment
Three recent cases stand for the proposition that a nonresident defendant can
engage in business in a forum state via electronic contacts, and that those
contacts may be sufficient to support exercise of personal jurisdiction by the
98. See generally supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
99. See William J. Cook, Four Internet Jurisdiction Cases Break Rule of Thumb, CHICAGO
LAW., Oct. 1996, at 76.
100. Some of the cases that have conferred jurisdiction over nonresidents include
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d
701 (6th Cir. 1996), Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGolda Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996), Edias
Software International, L.L.C. v. Basis International Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996),
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996), and Inset
Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
101. These paradigms are a result of the typical structure of state long-arm statutes. See
supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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forum state. They are CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,10 2 Resuscitation
Technologies, Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp.,0 3 and Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 104
In CompuServe, Richard Patterson, a Texas software developer and attorney,
entered into an agreement with CompuServe, an Ohio-based computer network
service, whereby CompuServe distributed Patterson's software via its computer
network service and received a portion of the revenue generated by its sales to
other users of the CompuServe system. 5 Patterson alleged that two similar
software applications distributed by CompuServe infringed on his common-law
trademarks.'1 6 CompuServe filed an action in Ohio seeking a declaratory
judgment that it had not infringed on Patterson's trademarks. 7
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (based in Cincinnati) found that
Patterson had purposefully directed commercial activities toward Ohio and
received economic benefit from doing so."' The court focused on the manner in
which Patterson used the Internet to develop a business relationship with
CompuServe. Using the Internet, Patterson had entered into a Shareware
Registration Agreement with CompuServe," 9 transmitted copies of his software
product electronically to CompuServe's Ohio-based computer system, and
advertised his software on that system. "0 Patterson received revenue from his use
of CompuServe's system, which was relayed to him from Ohio."' Finally,
Patterson communicated his threats of initiating legal action against CompuServe
via the electronic network." 2 Thus Patterson could have reasonably anticipated
being subject to suit in Ohio, and it was not unreasonable for him to defend
there. "
The court found support for its decision in prior cases that had held that,
although mere solicitation of business or entering into a contract within the state
was not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction, the fact that the defendant
"contemplated the ongoing marketing" of his product "in the forum state and
102. 89 F.3d 1257. Similar cases involving electronic contacts other than the Internet are
Plus System, Inc. v. New England Networ; Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992), and Pres-
Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
103. IP 96-1957-C-MIS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3523 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997).
104. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
105. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260.
106. See id. at 1261.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1266-67.
109. See id. at 1260. Such an agreement provides that the on-line service provider
(CompuServe) agrees to distribute software to its members for the creator. The service
members are expected to compensate the software creator through the service provider, who
takes a cut of the fee before forwarding it to the creator. In this case the shareware agreement
stipulated that it was being entered into in Ohio. See id. Note that the court does not dispute
the validity of this electronic contract. See id. at 1264.
110. See id. at 1267.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 1268.
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elsewhere" was significant."' While the district court analogized Patterson to a
consumer of CompuServe's services and emphasized the small number of sales
made to Ohio residents, the court of appeals viewed Patterson as an entrepreneur
seeking to take advantage of the interstate market for profit."5 The fact that
Patterson sought to benefit economically from his relationship with CompuServe
and had taken several steps in that regard outweighed any concern arising from
the fact that Patterson's connections with Ohio were based solely upon his
contract and subsequent communications with CompuServe.
In Resuscitation Technologies, Inc., the business relationship between the
parties grew out of the existence of plaintiff Resuscitation Technologies, Inc.'s
("RTI") Web site." 6 Defendant Continental had neither owned property in
Indiana nor conducted any prior business there." 7 Continental, a venture
capitalist, first became aware of RTI when it was searching the Web for business
opportunities."' RTI's Web site described it as a start-up medical device
company located in Indiana and in need of capital." 9 Continental responded to
the Web site by sending electronic mail to RTI requesting further information. 2 '
After that initial contact, the parties corresponded by electronic mail, telephone,
and regular mail.' Documents were faxed back and forth, and conference calls
were conducted, in furtherance of the negotiations between the parties.'
Ultimately, however, negotiations broke down and Continental threatened suit,
alleging that RTI had breached its agreement." RTI sought declaratory judgment
in its home state of Indiana. 24
114. Id at 1266 (citing Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 383-86 (6th
Cir. 1968)). Also significant to the court was the fact that the defendant "consciously reached
out from Texas to Ohio" to subscribe to CompuServe. Id. The court noted that the Supreme
Court has found that "the purposeful direction of one's activities toward a state has always been
significant in personal jurisdiction cases." Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985)).
115. See id. at 1265-68 ("Someone like Patterson who employs a computer network service
like CompuServe to market a product can reasonably expect disputes with that service to yield
lawsuits in the service's home state."). Alan Field, Beware Clients with an Internet Presence:
Decision Could Drag Them into an Undesirable Forum, INTELL. PROP. L. NEwSL. (Am. Bar
Ass'n Section of Intellectual Property Law, Chicago, Ill.), Fall 1996, at 3, 3-4, 30-31, explains
the differences in the two courts' reasoning. While the district court focused on the fact that
only twelve Ohio residents had purchased Patterson's software in four years, the court of
appeals emphasized the quality, not the quantity, of Patterson's contacts. The court of appeals
considered Patterson's repeated electronic mail communications to CompuServe evidence of
a business relationship, with CompuServe acting as the distributor for Patterson's software
product. See id. at 4.
116. See Resuscitation Techs., Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp., IP 96-1957-C-MIS,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3523, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997).
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at *3-*4.
121. See id.
122. See id at *4.
123. See id. at *7.
124. See id. at*8.
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In support of its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
Continental emphasized that it was RTI who solicited Continental's business
through the existence of its Web site."'2 The district court denied the motion to
dismiss, finding that although RTI initiated contact through its Web site, the
anticipated benefit of the Web site solicitation, namely a consummation of a
business deal, had occurred.' 26 The ensuing electronic contacts, "numerous and
continuous over a period of months," indicated an intent by both parties to
transact business in Indiana.'27 Since, "without question .... Continental...
reached beyond the boundaries of [its] own [state] to do business in Indiana," it
was not unreasonable for Continental to be haled into an Indiana forum." 8 This
approach of measuring the quality of the electronic contacts with reference to the
intended outcome of the activity was originally formulated by the Zippo court.
In Zippo, the court extended the CompuServe rationale to a situation where the
electronic contacts at issue were not those between the plaintiff and the
defendant, but those involving the defendant and residents of the forum state. 9
The plaintiff, Zippo, manufacturer of the well-known Zippo cigarette lighters,
sued the defendant, Dot Corn, for trademark infringement in the district court of
its home state, Pennsylvania. 3 Dot Corn, a California corporation, operated a
Web site and Internet news service using domain names including the word
"zippo."'' Dot Coin's Web site advertised its news service and provided a form
for Web users to subscribe to the service. The process of subscribing to the news
service could be completed electronically: the Web user could submit his or her
credit card number to Dot Corn via the Internet.'32
The Zippo court, in finding jurisdiction proper over the California defendant,
distinguished its case from the troublesome "Web site advertising" cases,
discussed infra Part II.C, because Dot Com had actually contracted electronically
with approximately 3000 individuals and Internet access providers in
Pennsylvania, knowing that they resided in Pennsylvania.'3 3 The end result of
these electronic transactions was that subscribers received electronic messages
via Dot Com's news service-messages that contained the word "zippo," the
subject matter of the litigation."'
The court rejected Dot Com's efforts to minimize the significance of its Web
site and characterize the Pennsylvania resident's contacts with it as
"fortuitous."'131 The court compared the nature of the contacts at issue with those
125. See id. at *4.
126. See id. at *14-*15, *20.
127. Id. at *17.
128. Id.
129. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
130. See id. at 1121.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1125-26.
134. See id. at 1126.
135. Id. It is true that technically, a Web user initiates contact with a Web site by "visiting"
the site. However, this technical reality does not foreclose the argument that the defendant
solicited business by operating a Web site in the first place. This is the approach of the Inset,
Maritz, and Heroes courts, discussed infra Part II.C.
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involved in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, '36 stating that Dot Corn's
contacts with Pennsylvania would have been fortuitous within the meaning of
World-Wide Volkswagen if, for example, Dot Corn did not have any Pennsylvania
subscribers, but an Ohio subscriber forwarded a Dot Corn file it had received to
a friend in Pennsylvania; or if the Ohio subscriber brought his portable computer
with him to Pennsylvania on a trip and used it there to access Dot Corn's
service. 137 Since the court concluded that Dot Com consciously chose to do
business with Pennsylvania residents, albeit from its Web site, the nature and
quality of its electronic contacts were sufficient to indicate purposeful
availment. 138 Citing language from Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, '39 the court
stated: "when an entity intentionally reaches beyond its boundaries to conduct
business with foreign residents, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper."'14 0
The court added, "[d]ifferent results should not be reached simply because
business is conducted over the Internet."'14 1
These "electronic commerce" cases involve activities that would have achieved
the same end result-completion of a business transaction between two
parties-whether conducted electronically or through a more traditional method.
Therefore, courts have been quite comfortable applying traditional jurisdictional
principles to Internet commerce situations.
B. Electronic Contacts Can Equal Tortious Conduct
Sufficient to Establish Purposeful Availment
Three recent cases illustratethat certain electronic communications, including
the existence of a Web site, can be of such injurious character that they form the
basis of personal jurisdiction in the forum where the majority of harm occurs:
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 42 Edias Software International,
L.L.C. v. Basis International Ltd., '43 and Digital Equipment Corp. v. AltaVista
Technology, Inc. 144 In Panavision, Toeppen registered as a domain name 45 the
name of Panavision's product, which was a registered trademark. Toeppen then
established a Web site at that address so that when Web users searched the Web
for the Panavision's product name, Toeppen's Web site would appear. As a
136. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
137. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121.
138. See id.
139. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
140. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475).
141. Id The Zippo decision has been regarded by courts and commentators as an appropriate
framework for the jurisdictional inquiry in the context of the Interet. See, e.g., Resuscitation
Techs., Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp., IP 96-1957-C-M/S, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3523
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997); Kepchar, supra note 6, at 7; Michael J. Wagner & Matthew G.
Allison, Internet Law, NAT'L L.J., July 7, 1997, at B5.
142. 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
143. 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
144. 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997).
145. A domain name is the location of a Web site, for example, "http://www.joe.com." See
Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 1997).
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result, Panavision was unable to post its own Web site using its product name.
Toeppen demanded $13,000 from Panavision to discontinue his use of the
name."'46 Because Toeppen was running a scam directed at California, the court
felt this case sounded more in tort than contract.'47 California had jurisdiction
over Toeppen under the "effects test" established in Calder v. Jones 48 because
Toeppen's injurious activity was expressly aimed at the California corporation
and the injury would mainly be felt in California, where plaintiff s products were
best known. That defendant's conduct took place over computer networks was
a secondary consideration to its intentional, directed, and injurious nature.'49
In Edias, the parties entered into an agreement whereby the Arizona plaintiff,
Edias, would distribute the defendant Basis's software in Europe. "s' Basis was
located in New Mexico. After relations went sour, Basis posted electronic mail
messages to its employees and European customers stating its reasons for
terminating its relationship with Edias and posted a message to its Web page
blaming Edias for the failure of the agreement.'' Edias sued in Arizona for
breach of contract, and also alleged that Basis's electronic communications
constituted libel, defamation, tortious interference with contract, and violation
of the Lanham Act.' Of particular note is that the Arizona court found
jurisdiction over Basis proper, agreeing with the plaintiff that the allegedly
defamatory statements established personal jurisdiction under the effects test
because they were directed at Arizona and allegedly caused foreseeable harm to
the plaintiff.' Further, the court pointed out that Web pages and electronic
messages are available to an audience potentially much larger than just the sender
and receiver. The court concluded: "Basis should not be permitted to take
advantage of modern technology through an Internet Web page and forum and
simultaneously escape traditional notions of jurisdiction."'5 4
146. See Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1300.
147. See id.
148. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). In Calder, the plaintiff, Shirley Jones, sued a number of
defendants concerning a story that had been published about her in a national tabloid. The
defendants resided in Florida, but the Supreme Court upheld California's jurisdiction noting
that the plaintiffs relationship with the forum intensified the importance of the defendants'
forum contacts-the story was written about a California resident and the brunt of the harm
would be felt in California. See id. at 788-89; see also Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus., I 1
F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Personal jurisdiction can be predicated on intentional
actions ... expressly aimed at the forum state ... causing harm, the brunt of which is
suffered-and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered-in the forum state."). For
an interesting discussion of the Calder holding, see Counts & Martin, supra note 67, at 1123.
149. The negligent/intentional distinction is the main point of contrast in meeting the
purposeful-availment requirement when the injury occurs in the forum state due to an out-of-
state act by the defendant. See 1 CASAD, supra note 13, § 7.02[2][b], at 7-10 to 7-11.
150. See Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 415 (D. Ariz.
1996).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 419-20.
154. Id. at 420.
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Digital involved a similar business relationship gone sour.' Both parties were
providers of certain Internet services. The plaintiff Digital, a Massachusetts
corporation, and the defendant AltaVista Technology, Inc. ("ATI"), a California
corporation, entered into'a licensing agreement whereby the parties allocated
certain rights as to the use of the trademark "AltaVista." The scope of this
agreement was hotly disputed by the parties. Consistent with its broader view of
the agreement, ATI altered its Web site so that it was nearly identical to Digital's
AltaVista search service.
5 6
The Digital court, while recognizing that ATI had purposefully structured its
affairs to try to avoid the Massachusetts forum," 7 also considered that ATI had
conducted business with a Massachusetts corporation, had allegedly infringed
that corporation's trademark, and had breached the licensing agreement with that
corporation. Such factors were a proper indication of purposeful availment
because the bulk of injury would occur in Massachusetts. ATI knew its Web site
would attract Massachusetts residents, and Massachusetts residents did access
the site, causing harm to Digital's trademarks.' However, the court also noted
that many consumers outside Massachusetts would also be harmed by the
confusion resulting from the defendant's allegedly infringing use of the
plaintiff's trademark. 59
Noteworthy is that the Digital court wrestled with the significance of Keeton
and Calder in assessing the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts with
Massachusetts, concluding that "the case before me is a poignant combination
of Calder's 'hits hardest at home' and Keeton's 'hits hard everywhere' 'effects'
tests."'
160
Similar to the electronic commerce cases, the harm caused by the defendants
above could have been accomplished through more traditional means.
Nonetheless, the speed and efficiency at which electronic communications can
access a wide audience multiplies the effect of injurious activity in the Internet
context. These characteristics point in favor of the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.
C. The "Web Site Advertising" Cases
While it is fairly clear that doing business on the World Wide Web or
conducting tortious activity electronically can subject a defendant to personal
jurisdiction in a forum with which it otherwise has no significant contacts,
Internet communications cases that fall between these two categories pose more
difficulty. In particular, the so-called "Web site advertising" cases have spawned
a fierce debate regarding the level of Internet activity that is necessary for a court
to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.' 6' The unique
155. Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997).
156. See id. at 459-60.
157. See id. at 468.
158. See id. at 469-70.
159. See id. at 470 n.30.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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features of the World Wide Web, in particular its geographic independence, have
rendered critical courts' interpretations of the scope of such terms as
"purposeful" and "fortuitous."' 62 District courts in Connecticut, Missouri,
Minnesota, the District of Columbia, and Florida have indicated that the
existence of a Web site for advertising purposes may be sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction.'63 In contrast, courts in New York have required, in
addition to the existence of a Web site, other significant evidence that the
defendant purposefully directed activity toward the forum.' 64
1. The "Pro-Jurisdiction" Cases
Cases that have granted personal jurisdiction chiefly on the existence of a Web
site have done so primarily by analyzing the degree to which the site was
commercial or interactive in nature. These cases have also emphasized that Web
sites are available continuously and repeatedly to Web users. Inset Systems, Inc.
v. Instruction Set, Inc. 65 represents the broadest reading of personal jurisdiction
rules in this context thus far.'66 In Inset, both the plaintiff and the defendant were
international players in the computer services industry. The defendant's principal
place of business was Massachusetts; the plaintiff's, Connecticut. The defendant
obtained a Web site address and an 800 telephone number containing the word
"INSET." The plaintiff owned the federal trademark "INSET," and learned of the
defendant's use of the name when it attempted to establish a Web site at the same
address.' 67 Although the defendant otherwise conducted no business in
Connecticut, and did not maintain an office, sales force or employees within the
state, the district court held that jurisdiction was proper because defendant's Web
site and 800 telephone number were designed to communicate with people "not
only [in] the state of Connecticut, but [in] all states," the Web site advertisement
was "available continuously to any Internet user," and the Web site could reach
as many as 10,000 users in Connecticut alone. 16 According to the court, these
162. See Kepchar, supra note 6, at 7.
163. See Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v.
CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set,
Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996); State by Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 1996
WL 767431 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Dec. 11, 1996), affd, 568 N.W.2d. 715 (Minn. App. 1997);
Wagner & Allison, supra note 141, at B5 (citing M&B Beverage Corp. v. New York N.Y.
Hotel, L.L.C., 96-2481-CIV (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 1996), which held that a defendant's Internet
advertising was evidence that the defendant had purposefully directed activities toward the
forum in an effort to maximize profits).
164. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); see also IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Ill. 1997); cf
McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. CIV. 95-4037, 1996 WL 753991 (S.D. Cal. Aug.
5, 1996) (refusing to grant general jurisdiction on the basis of existence of a Web site).
165. 937 F. Supp. 161.
166. See Mark A. Epstein, Dealing with Jurisdictional Issues Presented by the Internet;
Guidance for Trademark Owners, MULTIMEDIA STRATEGIST, Aug. 1996, at 1, 4.
167. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 162-63.
168. Id. at 165.
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facts indicated the defendant had "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
doing business within Connecticut."' 69 Since the defendant had purposefully
directed its advertising activities toward Connecticut on a continuing basis, it
could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there, the court concluded.
17
Although not explicitly stated, one can surmise that the court, lacking very
substantial evidence of purposeful availment, decided this case primarily on
reasonableness grounds.1
7
'
The defendant in Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation 7 maintained a Web site
that provided information about its charitable organization. The plaintiff, another
charitable organization located in Washington, D.C., brought suit in the District
of Columbia alleging trademark infringement. The plaintiff had owned the
registered mark "HEROES" and corresponding logo since 1964; its mission was
to aid the families of firefighters and police officers killed in the line of duty in
the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia areas.' The defendant began
using the name "HEROES FOUNDATION" and a similar logo for a charity with
the same purpose in 1990. In 1993, the defendant also started using the name to
solicit donations to fight cystic fibrosis.7 The court rejected the defendant's
attempt to "soft-pedal" the significance of its Web site, '75 noting that the Web
site specifically invited Web users to make donations to the defendant by calling
an 800-number or sending an electronic mail message to the defendant.' 76 In
addition to its Web site, the defendant's contact with the District of Columbia
included the publication of an advertisement in the Washington Post
newspaper.' 7' The court upheld jurisdiction over the defendant based on the
existence of the newspaper advertisement, which, as the court noted, was
published in a newspaper of local, not national, circulation and the Web site.
Regarding the presence of the Web site, the court found relevant the fact that the
site explicitly solicited contributions, provided a toll-free number, and contained
the allegedly infringing trademark and logo.'78 The court also characterized the
Web site as a "sustained contact with the District," since it had been "possible
for a District resident to gain access to it at anytime since it was first posted."'
179
Thus, the court concluded that by soliciting donations via the Web site and the
local newspaper advertisement, the defendant had purposefully availed itself of
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. For example, the court noted that the commute time for the defendant to Connecticut
would be less than two hours, and that the case presented issues of Connecticut common and
statutory law. Therefore, adjudication in Connecticut would dispose of the case efficiently. See
id.
172. 958 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996).
173. See id. at 2.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 4.
176. See id. at 5.
177. See id. at 3-4.
178. See id. at 5.
179. Id.
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the privilege of conducting business within the district, and could reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there. 8 '
Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc. 181 involved an even more "interactive"' 8 2 Web
site than Heroes or Inset, moving it closer to a "transacting business" case like
Zippo or CompuServe. CyberGold was a California firm that planned to create
electronic mailing lists of Internet users and provide an information-distributing
service over the Internet. Maritz, a Missouri corporation, brought suit in a district
court in its home state, alleging trademark infringement. Although its service was
not yet operational, CyberGold's Web site advertised and solicited customers for
its new service. I"3 The court analyzed the quality and quantity of defendant's
contacts with Missouri in upholding jurisdiction over the defendant.8 4 As to the
quality of the electronic contacts, the court first observed that the "contacts
provided by the maintenance of a website on the internet are clearly of a different
nature and quality than other means of contact with a forum," because the
Internet is capable of rapidly accessing a global audience. 5 Next, the court
noted that the Web site at issue automatically responded via electronic mail to
users who signed up on its mailing list. Thus, the court rejected defendant's
characterization of its Web site as merely a "passive" activity, observing that
defendant's "intent [was] to reach all Internet users, regardless of geographic
location."'86 The interactive nature of the defendant's Web site, and the fact that
the defendant's objective in operating the Web site was to conduct business with
residents of any state, favored the exercise of personal jurisdiction. '87 As to the
quantity of contacts, the court observed that at least 130 Missouri residents had
accessed the defendant's Web site.' 8 An additional factor that favored
jurisdiction was that the defendant's communications with Web users constituted
part of the activity the plaintiff claimed infringed on its trademark.'89 In assessing
the reasonableness factors, the court noted that Missouri had a strong interest in
determining whether one of its corporations' trademarks was'being infringed. 90
Finally, the court stated that the defendant had not established that its burden of
defending in Missouri would be so severe as to implicate the traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.'
In State by Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., the State of Minnesota
brought deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and consumer fraud claims
180. See id.
181. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
182. An interactive Web site is one that, for example, integrates the electronic mail
capabilities of the Internet with the Web site, enabling the Web user and Web site operator to
exchange electronic messages. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,
1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
183. See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330.
184. See id. at 1332.
185. Id. at 1333.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 1334.
191. See id.
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against the Nevada operators of a Web site that advertised a future on-line
betting service.'92 Like the Heroes Web site, the defendant's Web site here
provided Web users the opportunity to be placed on an electronic mailing list and
advertised a toll-free telephone number.'93 Addressing the quality of the
defendant's contacts with Minnesota, the court stated: "Defendants attempt to
hide behind the Internet and claim that they mailed nothing to Minnesota, sent
nothing to Minnesota, and never advertised in Minnesota. This argument is not
sound in the age of cyberspace.... [T]hat advertisement is available 24 hours a
day ... to any Internet user.... ." ' Furthermore, the facts that the Web site gave
a direct number to call, and that Minnesota residents were on the mailing list
were "more than sufficient evidence that Defendants [had] made a direct
marketing campaign to the State of Minnesota."'95 The fact that Minnesota had
an interest in determining whether its residents had been defrauded or
fraudulently induced to enter a transaction also seemed to play a role in the
court's finding of jurisdiction."'
To summarize, the "pro-jurisdiction" courts appear to recognize that the unique
features of the World Wide Web render it a much more powerful advertising and
solicitation tool than other mediums. These courts generally have found
jurisdiction proper when the defendant clearly had an objective of using the Web
to conduct business, although commerce may not yet have taken place. 97 The
number of contacts the defendant has actually made with forum residents through
an interactive Web site is also considered. Lastly, the significance of the Web
site is enhanced if it contains content, such as a company name or logo, that is
the subject of the litigation.
2. The "No-Jurisdiction" Cases
At least one district court has flatly refused to find jurisdiction proper based
on a Web site that merely solicits business, but does not actually engage in
commerce. 8 Jurisdiction over a nonresident Web site owner was denied by a
U.S. district court in New York in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, a case
192. State by Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 1996 WL 767431, at * I (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Dec. 11, 1996), affd, 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. App. 1997).
193. See id. at *2.
194. Id. at *6.
195. Id. at *7. The defendant knew that at least 248 computers located in Minnesota had
accessed its Web site, and that two of the top 500 people accessing its site were from
Minnesota. See id. at *8.
196. See id.
197. For example, the Maritz court noted that "[t]he information transmitted [by the
defendant] is clearly intended as a promotion of CyberGold's upcoming service and a
solicitation for internet users, CyberGold's potential customers." Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold,
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996). Although the Heroes court did not decide
jurisdiction was proper on the basis of a Web site alone, it noted that the defendant's Web site
"explicitly solicit[ed] contributions, and provid[ed] a toll-free telephone number for that
purpose." Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996).
198. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
with facts similar to Inset.'99 King owned a small club in a Missouri college town
called The Blue Note. He posted a Web site that advertised the club, provided
ticket information, and listed a telephone number for ticket orders. The plaintiff,
operator of The Blue Note jazz club in New York City and owner of the federal
trademark "The Blue Note," sued for trademark infringement based on a logo
displayed on King's Web site.2" The court found that King had done nothing to
purposefully avail himself of the benefits of New York because, even though a
New York resident could access the Web site, it would have taken several steps
for the user to purchase tickets for the Missouri club, including placing a phone
call to Missouri and picking up tickets there.2"' Due process was not satisfied
because King had not made a specific effort to target its product toward New
York, although it was foreseeable to him that New York residents could access
the site and be confused.2 °2
The same U.S. district court declined jurisdiction again in Hearst Corp. v.
Goldberger. 3 In Hearst, lawyer-defendant Ari Goldberger, a resident of New
Jersey, established a Web site, using the domain name "Esqwire.com," which he
envisioned as becoming a "virtual law firm" through which he would offer legal
services and products. 2" The New York publishers of Esquire magazine sued for
trademark infringement.2 5 The Web site invited users interested in more
information to contact the defendant via electronic mail, however it is unclear
whether it provided users with the opportunity to send mail directly from the
site.2"6 Although New Yorkers had accessed the Web site, the court, comparing
the Web site to an advertisement in a national magazine,20 7 emphasized that the
defendant had not yet sold any products or services in New York or elsewhere.20 8
Significantly, the court went out of its way to expressly reject the reasoning of
the Inset, Maritz, and Heroes courts,20 9 stating that such reasoning would "'be
tantamount to a declaration that this Court, and every other court throughout the
199. See id.
200. See id. at 297-98.
20 1. See id. at 299.
202. See id. at 299-301 ("Creating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce,
may be felt nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act purposefully
directed toward the forum state."). Note also that the court explicitly distinguished the
CompuServe case as containing "vastly different facts." Id. at 301.
203. No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
204. Id. at *3.
205. See id. at * 15.
206. See id. at *4.
207. According to the opinion, New York law is clear that advertisements in national
publications are not sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction under its long-arm statute. See
id. at * 10. Further, the court cited several cases that held that such advertisements did not
satisfy constitutional due process requirements. See id. at * II n.13.
208. See id. at *10.
209. See id. at *20.
[Vol. 73:297
1997] WEB SITE AS BASIS FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION 323
world, may assert [personal] jurisdiction over all information providers on the
global World Wide Web."'
21
The district court appears to require O'Connor-style "additional contacts" in
order for it to exercise personal jurisdiction on the basis of a Web site. 211 This
district's opinions emphasize a technical feature of the World Wide Web: that it
is the Web user who initially "contacts" defendant's Web site by one of the
methods discussed in Part II.212 This court also apparently refuses to distinguish
between passive and interactive Web sites, since it rejects not only the reasoning
of the Inset court, but also explicitly disagrees with Maritz and Heroes.
III. FINDING PERSONAL JURISDICTION ON THE BASIS OF A
WEB SITE
In the context of Web site communications, the jurisdictional inquiry centers
around determining when electronic contacts become "purposeful" rather than
"fortuitous," such that they satisfy the constitutional requirements for personal
jurisdiction. This section argues that the approach of the "pro-jurisdiction"
courts is an appropriate response to the unique nature of Web site
communications and is consistent with existing due process principles.
The magnificent speed and efficiency with which Web site communications
reach a vast global audience multiplies greatly the effect of such communications
in comparison to more traditional methods of communication. Due to the nature
of the Internet, the possibility of harm seems particularly great in cases of
210. Id. (quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032,
1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). Interestingly, however, the Hearst court hinted that special
congressional legislation might be appropriate: "The Court declines to reach such a far-
reaching result in the absence of a Congressional enactment of Internet specific trademark
infringement personal jurisdiction legislation." Id. Further, while the Hearst court cites
Playboy, that case did not concern personal jurisdiction. Playboy involved an Italian publisher
who was subject to an injunction prohibiting it from selling or distributing its Playmen
magazine in the United States. The Italian publisher created a Web site for its magazine. The
U.S. court enforced the injunction against the Web site with respect to U.S. citizens, rejecting
defendant's argument that he was merely posting images on a cemputer in Italy, rather than
distributing them to anyone in the United States. See also James S. DeGraw, Italian Internet
Site Operator Violates U.S. Injunction, II COMPUTER L. ASS'N BULL. 1, 14 (1996).
21 1. See supra Part I.A.1.
212. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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trademark and copyright infringement? 3 However, the possibility of extreme
harm is not limited to such cases, as was evidenced by Granite Gate and Edias.1"
The unique characteristics of Web site communications resist analogy to more
familiar means-several courts have considered and rejected analogies to
telephone, radio, television, and newspaper. The Hearst court's comparison of
a Web site to an advertisement in a nationally distributed magazine is only
partially satisfactory. The similarity between these two mediums ends with the
observation that both are available to a national, even global, audience while the
content of either is rarely, at least initially, directed at any particular forum.
Magazines are distributed only periodically, and are typically disposed of
quickly. Meanwhile, Web sites are distributed once to all who use the Web, and
are then available continuously until removed by the Web site operator. Web
users may, in addition, "bookmark" a Web site so that they may return to it
frequently without having to remember its exact whereabouts. Further, magazine
advertisements are one-dimensional and require an additional step to be taken to
contact the advertiser. In contrast, Web sites are capable of providing much more
interesting content, including sound and video. Web sites also allow an
immediate response by enabling users to contact the advertiser directly from the
Web site via electronic mail. The likelihood that an individual will see,
remember, return to, and respond to an advertisement in a magazine is therefore
likely to be significantly lower than with a Web site. These factors, combined
with the immense diversity of the global Web audience, greatly increase the odds
that a Web site will produce business for the Web advertiser. As evidence, many
commercial entities now view their Web sites as an essential part of doing
business.
Hence, the Hearst court's view of the Web site advertiser as one who
innocently posts a "billboard" for Web users to view if they so desire may have
been accurate in the early days of the Internet," 5 but is no longer valid. As the
Inset, Maritz, and Heroes courts have recognized, businesses that operate Web
sites have intentionally elected to solicit business from potentially anyone in the
world. Further, there is a good argument that businesses that choose to use
another's trade name for their own profit intend to do business with that entity's
customers.
213. For a discussion of why this is so, see James H. Aiken, Comment, The Jurisdiction of
Trademark and Copyright Infringement on the Internet, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1331 (1997).
Aiken argues that the Inset, Maritz, and Zippo cases should be viewed as models for future
litigation. See id. at 1350. Note that even the Hearst court recognized the particular problems
of trademark owners. First, the nature of the Web favors the use of corporate names as domain
names. Trademark-protected names are often at risk because of their broad recognition. Thus,
domain names also have become a valuable corporate asset. See Hearst, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2065, at *2. Second, as the Hearst court noted, the trademark owner is often in a Catch-22
situation: if it waits until a Web site is actually used to conduct commerce with Web users in
its own jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over the defendant might be appropriate but the
trademark owner would probably be faced with laches-type defenses, not to mention greater
harm to its mark. See id. at * 11.
214. Thus, a narrow rule limiting the expansion ofjurisdiction to one type of cause of action,
as indirectly proposed by the Hearst court is inappropriate. See supra note 210.
215. See Cook, supra note 99.
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The Inset holding (that the existence of a passive Web site and an 800-number
alone support jurisdiction over a nonresident) may represent the outer limits of
personal jurisdiction in the Internet context. However, the "sliding scale"
approach, employed by the Zippo court, of assessing the commercial and
interactive nature of the Web site versus the quantity of contacts with the forum,
seems appropriate for the Web site advertising cases. Additionally, since in these
cases it is more difficult to find evidence that the defendant purposefully directed
activity toward a given forum, a finding that the defendant's Web site contributed
significantly to its entire business operation strongly supports purposeful
availment.
21 6
Those who argue for adoption of the Hearst court's view claim that little "mom
and pop" businesses who operate a Web site merely with the intent of serving
their own locale will be forced to defend suit anywhere their Web site is
accessed, if a broader view of personal jurisdiction is adopted . 2 7 For example,
the defendant in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King probably had no intention
of soliciting business in New York. However, if his Web site did happen to
attract New York customers, King most likely would not have turned them down.
Further, if musicians from New York contacted King after having viewed his
Web site (perhaps they stumbled on it by mistake while looking for the Web site
of the famous New York jazz club), King would probably consider the
opportunity to have them play at his Missouri club. Such situations are likely to
be common in the Web site context. However, a constitutional jurisdictional
result can still be reached using a framework such as that proposed by the Zippo
court,218 without requiring additional contacts or launching an inquiry into intent.
Under a Zippo-style analysis, personal jurisdiction over King in New York would
probably still be denied because King's Web site was not interactive and there
was no evidence that New Yorkers had accessed his Web site. In contrast, had
King designed his Web site such that interested musicians could and did respond
electronically, that activity, combined with the knowledge that many musicians
reside in the New York area, may have rendered jurisdiction proper in New York.
The approach of the "pro-jurisdiction" courts is consistent with the
fundamental principles of due process. The World Wide Web can appropriately
be viewed as an established channel of distribution under the stream-of-
commerce theory because entities that operate a Web site have consciously
decided to enter the realm of interstate, and even global, commerce-even if their
primary objective is to serve a local market. A Web site is more akin to a product
than a mere advertisement because of the Web site's unique content and
interactive capabilities. As indicated by the Zippo court, the operation of an
interactive Web site creates contacts with a forum that are more than merely
fortuitous. Therefore, the issues and policy concerns that gave rise to the stream-
of-commerce rationale are also applicable here.
216. For example, in Maritz and Zippo, the defendant's business operated entirely from a
desktop. By contrast, in Bensusan and Inset, the defendant's Web site merely supplemented its
"normal" business.
217. See, e.g., Kalow, supra note 89.
218. See supra Part II.A.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The approach of Justice Brennan, as indicated in his Asahi opinion, 219 is most
consistent with the reasoning of the Inset, Maritz, and Heroes courts, and is
appropriate for this context. Web site operators are well aware of the global
expanse of the Internet, and the potentially huge return on the relatively minimal
investment required to set up a Web site. Web site operators therefore should not
be able to evade jurisdiction simply by using the Internet to conduct business,
while still reaping the economic benefits. The view of Justice O'Connor, more
in line with the Bensusan and Hearst decisions, is inappropriate due to the
characteristics of Web site communications discussed above. It is unreasonable
to require plaintiffs to demonstrate affirmatively that Web site operators have
specifically targeted a particular forum state over others. On the contrary, it is
much more feasible for Web site operators, such as the defendant in Bensusan,
to specify that they wish to limit the scope of their solicitation to a particular
region by refusing to honor requests from residents of forums in which they do
not wish to be subject to jurisdiction, or by limiting their Web site to password-
only access.
The concern that the Inset-Maritz-Heroes approach will expose defendants to
national, or worldwide, jurisdiction is overstated. Cumulatively, these cases
based jurisdictional decisions on a set of rational factors intended to evaluate the
extent to which the Web site owner expected to reap economic reward from the
existence of its Web site. This analysis, having taken guidance from Keeton and
Calder, also considers the location of the greatest amount of harm. Therefore,
forum-shopping should not be any greater of an issue than in other contexts.
Finally, if the result of Asahi is any indication, an evaluation of the
reasonableness factors may serve to defeat jurisdiction in appropriate cases,
regardless of whether the Brennan or O'Connor approach to purposeful
availment is followed.
CONCLUSION
Web site communications differ from other modes of communication in
significant ways. The speed and efficiency with which complex messages reach
a vast global audience drastically multiplies the impact of such messages. For
commercial entities, economic gains may be realized more quickly and in larger
quantity. At the same time, unscrupulous Web users can inflict harm on
intellectual property owners, consumers, and others much more effectively than
through other methods. The features of Web site communications, and their
potential rewards and consequences, thus favor a more expansive, rather than a
more restrictive, view of personal jurisdiction.
Traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine is not unworkable in the context of
these electronic interactions. Historically the doctrine has proved to be quite
flexible: as technological advances have facilitated interstate relations, the scope
219. Neither the Brennan view, nor the O'Connor view, represents the law, since both views
only gathered the support of four justices. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
105 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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of personal jurisdiction has expanded to include nonresident defendants in more
and new situations. The development of the Internet, and particularly the World
Wide Web, is a new context which, because it operates without regard to
geographic territory, calls for further expansion of the permissible scope of
personal jurisdiction. An indication from the Supreme Court of the proper
meaning of "purposeful availment" would greatly aid courts that must deal with
such electronic contacts.
Existing jurisdictional principles can be easily applied to cases involving
electronic commerce and the commission of tortious behavior through electronic
means because suitable analogies exist. The so-called "Web site advertising"
cases have posed greater difficulty for the courts because a suitable analogy has
not been found. Of the two approaches to jurisdiction that district courts have
developed, the more appropriate approach is that which favors the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over entities that solicit business through a Web site.
Granted, it is somewhat troubling to hold these entities responsible for the
potential cost of defending litigation in any forum where transaction of business
may be the ultimate objective. However, considering the minimal effort required
to establish a Web site and the potential results of Web activities, it is even more
troublesome to allow such entities to reap the benefits of conducting business on
the Web while avoiding jurisdiction in any state except where they are physically
located.

